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Overview

The U.S. economy has a “market power” problem, notwithstanding our strong and extensive
antitrust institutions. The surprising conjunction of the exercise of market power with wellestablished antitrust norms, precedents, and enforcement institutions is the central paradox of
U.S. competition policy today.
As this policy brief explains, the harms from the exercise of firms’ market power may extend
beyond individual markets affected to include slower overall economic growth and increased
economic inequality. The implications for future economic productivity and welfare are troubling, but before detailing these consequences, it is necessary to understand why market power
is a major issue despite well-established antitrust enforcement institutions and legal precedents.

Market power in an era of antitrust
We live in an era of antitrust. The United States has well-established norms against anticompetitive conduct, experienced enforcement institutions, a rich body of judicial precedents, and
an active and knowledgeable community of antitrust lawyers and economists. These norms,
precedents, and institutions are remarkable in their scope and depth. They have undoubtedly
discouraged a great deal of anticompetitive conduct by businesses.1
Most antitrust cases are noticed by the affected industry and the antitrust community only, but
some achieve wider public attention. In recent years, for example, antitrust enforcers famously
stepped in to prosecute Archer Daniels Midland Co. for agreeing with its major global competitors to boost the price of lysine;2 to stop Microsoft Corp. from monopolizing the operating
systems for Intel-compatible personal computers by limiting, among other things, the growth
of Netscape Communications’ Internet browser;3 and to prevent AT&T Inc. from acquiring
Deutsche Telekom AG’s T-Mobile USA Inc. affiliate, one of AT&T’s rivals in providing retail
mobile wireless communications.4

1

The Washington Center for Equitable Growth | Market power in the U.S. economy today

Yet there are a number of reasons for concern about the exercise of what economists
refer to as market power. Firms exercise market power in their output markets as sellers
either by raising prices relative to what they would charge in a competitive market or by
reducing quality or convenience or otherwise altering terms of trade adversely with their
customers. Firms can also exercise market power as buyers by lowering prices or altering
terms of trade adversely to sellers.
While seller market power has been more extensively studied, many of the reasons
for concern about its exercise in the U.S. economy today are also reasons for concern
about the exercise of market power by buyers. Some of those reasons suggest that sellers
exercise substantial market power, and others suggest that the exercise of market power
has been widening for decades—extending to more markets, increasing in importance
within markets, or both. None is decisive individually, but collectively they make a compelling case that market power has become a serious problem in the U.S. economy.
Among those reasons are:
• Insufficient deterrence of anticompetitive coordinated conduct
• Insufficient deterrence of anticompetitive mergers between rivals
• Insufficient deterrence of anticompetitive exclusion
• Market power is durable
• Increased equity ownership of rival firms by diversified financial investors
• The rise of dominant information technology platforms
• Oligopolies are common and concentration is increasing in many industries
• Increased governmental restraints on competition
• The decline in economic dynamism
Let’s examine each in turn.

Insufficient deterrence of anticompetitive coordinated conduct
The steady rate at which the U.S. Department of Justice uncovers criminal price-fixing
and market-division cartels, year after year,5 combined with evidence that that penalties
for collusion and treble damage awards to victims are systematically too low6—along
with the absence of evidence that criminal enforcement systematically chills procompetitive conduct or induces excessive expenditures on antitrust compliance—indicates that
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the antitrust laws do not sufficiently deter collusive conduct. Some cartels are purely
domestic, and others are global, with harm to buyers in the United States and elsewhere.
This form of anticompetitive business behavior has little or no procompetitive justification. It likely allows sellers to overcharge U.S. buyers by billions of dollars annually.7
Even more troubling, cartel prosecutions by the Justice Department are probably only
the tip of a large market-power iceberg arising from coordinated conduct among oligopolists. It is probably substantially easier to deter express price-fixing and market division,
which is what is usually involved in criminal cases, than it is to deter tacit collusion that
leads to higher prices.
That’s why it is reasonable to infer from the cartel statistics that the exercise of market power arising from anticompetitive coordinated conduct is common in oligopoly
markets. One case in point: A recent study found that coordination between brewing
behemoths—the MillerCoors joint venture (now owned by Molson Coors Brewing
Co.) and Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV (owner of the Budweiser brand)—raised beer
prices by at least 6 percent after the joint venture was consummated in 2008.8

Insufficient deterrence of anticompetitive mergers between rivals
Nor are anticompetitive mergers adequately deterred. A recent study of mergers
between rival manufacturing firms between 1998 and 2006 finds that those deals systematically increased profit margins at acquired plants without reducing costs, suggesting that the lost competition from mergers generally resulted in higher prices.9
On average, moreover, so-called horizontal mergers (between two firms in the same market) that were close calls at the two federal antitrust enforcement agencies—the Justice
Department and the Federal Trade Commission—turned out to harm competition.10
Systematic over-optimism among acquiring firms about the efficiencies they can achieve
through acquisitions may help explain why too many harmful mergers between rivals are
proposed.11 A book-length business strategy analysis points to bad acquisitions as “the
single most important reason for underperformance by media companies,” for example.12

Insufficient deterrence of anticompetitive exclusion
The antitrust rules today insufficiently deter harmful exclusionary practices that raise
rivals’ costs or limit rivals’ access to customers,13 including those implemented through
so-called vertical agreements (also termed vertical restraints), which are between a firm
and its suppliers, distributors, or customers.14 That conclusion is consistent with the
evidence that more than one-quarter of international cartels used vertical restraints to
support collusion,15 and with the evidence that prices were higher and output lower in
U.S. states in which one vertical practice—resale price maintenance—was subject to
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rule-of-reason review (which evaluates its actual or likely competitive effects) than in
states that kept the per se ban (which looks only to its nature).16
While some interpret the economic evidence on the competitive consequences of vertical agreements as counseling against enforcement, that interpretation is based heavily
on studies of markets other than the oligopoly settings in which antitrust enforcement is
concentrated and on studies that do not account for the possibility that the anticompetitive uses of vertical agreements were deterred by past antitrust rules.17 It is not surprising
that anticompetitive exclusionary conduct is insufficiently deterred, given that the U.S.
Supreme Court’s antitrust decisions from the late 1970s through early 1990s (which are
largely still followed) targeted for relaxation rules governing exclusionary conduct.18

Market power is durable
Market power is a concern not only because it is common, but also because it is durable.
Among cartels cut short by antitrust enforcement, the average cartel has been found to
last more than eight years and a number have survived for at least 40 years.19 To similar
effect, even when monopolies or near-monopolies have eroded over time, they have
often persisted for decades. Think General Motors Co. (automobiles), International
Business Machines Corp. (computers), Eastman Kodak Co. (photographic film), RCA
Corp. (television sets), United States Steel Corp. (steel), and Xerox Corp. (copiers) over
much of the 20th century.
In many cases, moreover, dominant firms and colluding firms have erected entry barriers
to exclude new rivals. This evidence shows that anticompetitive conduct can often be sustained for long periods of time, overcoming the incentive of firms to cheat on cartels and
the incentive of fringe rivals and entrants to expand and compete away monopoly profits.

Increased equity ownership of rival firms by
diversified financial investors
Large institutional investors such as BlackRock Inc., FMR LLC’s Fidelity Investments,
State Street Corp., and The Vanguard Group Inc. now collectively own roughly twothirds of the shares of publicly traded U.S. firms overall, up from about one-third in
1980.20 As a result, it has become common for rival firms to have common financial
investor ownership.21
Recent studies of the airline and banking industries suggest that when competing firms have
the same large shareholders, they may refrain from competing aggressively against each
other, leading to higher prices.22 This evidence, combined with the growth and widespread
nature of the practice, raises the possibility that financial investor ownership of rival firms has
become a pervasive and increasing source of market power throughout U.S. industry.
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The rise of dominant information technology platforms
Many information technology firms that have become large during the recent past—
such as Apple Inc., Bloomberg L.P., Facebook Inc., Alphabet Inc.’s Google Inc. subsidiary, Microsoft Corp., and Oracle Corp.—have likely achieved those positions, at least in
part, through varying combinations of network effects, intellectual property protections,
endogenous sunk costs, and the absence of divided technical leadership.23 As a result,
their platforms are probably insulated from competition in some of their major markets.
These platforms have delivered substantial consumer benefits, and their conduct does
not necessarily violate antitrust laws. Yet consumers and the U.S. economy as a whole
would likely benefit even more if they faced greater competition.24

Oligopolies are common and concentration
is increasing in many industries
Many markets are oligopolies, in which a small number of firms account for most sales.
A number of major industries, including airlines, brewing, and hospitals, have become
substantially more concentrated over recent decades.25 The number of major U.S. airlines, for example, including regional and low-cost carriers, has declined after multiple
mergers, from nine in 2005 to four today. Similarly, in brewing, Anheuser-Busch InBev
SA/NV and Molson Coors Brewing Co. account for nearly three-fourths of the beer
sold in the United States and likely exercise market power notwithstanding competition
from the many craft brewers that have entered in recent years.26 Likewise, a number of
studies show that hospital industry consolidation has led to higher prices.27
Some evidence suggests that concentration has risen generally in U.S. manufacturing,28
and perhaps also in other sectors.29 Other evidence involving broad national aggregates
also is consistent with rising concentration,30 but it may instead reflect that large firms
increasingly compete with the same large rivals across multiple product lines or regions.31
Coordinated conduct is a serious threat in oligopolies for several reasons. First, oligopolists, acting in their individual interest, may have an incentive not to compete
aggressively.32 Second, businesses are taught to exploit gaps in antitrust rules to engage
in coordinated conduct without running afoul of those rules.33 Third, the empirical economics literature finds that greater market concentration is associated with an increased
risk of anticompetitive conduct.34

Increased governmental restraints on competition
Governmental restraints on competition appear to have grown in past decades. These
include more extensive occupational licensing.35 They also include growth in the scope
of what may be patented, along with an excessive number of patents improperly granted
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as a result of inadequate review of patent applications.36 To similar effect, competitive
harm from “pay-for-delay” settlements—high drug prices that arise when the settlement
of patent disputes under an industry-specific regulatory framework delays the entry of
generic pharmaceuticals—has increased over time,37 though it is possible that the trend
changed in 2013, when the Supreme Court made antitrust challenges easier.38
Lobbying and other political rent-seeking activity by firms to limit competition and
boost supra-competitive profits—a precursor to governmental restraints—may also be
increasing.39 For instance, one form of lobbying that may lead to competitive harm—
citizen petitions from drug companies before the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
seeking to delay entry by rivals—has “essentially doubled” since 2003.40

The decline in economic dynamism
The troubling decline in dynamism of the U.S. economy over the past few decades is consistent with a concern about widening market power, though the jury is still out about the
contribution of market power relative to other plausible causal factors. The most productive firms and plants in the economy are expanding less rapidly now than they did before
2000,41 and the rate of startups has been declining for nearly four decades.42
Moreover, economic growth increasingly comes from improvements to existing products by incumbent firms rather than the displacement of existing products by better
ones or the creation of new product varieties. Incumbent firms are increasingly accounting for productivity improvements relative to entrants and other rivals.43
Widening market power of productive firms offers one plausible interpretation for
these macroeconomic trends: If productive firms are often insulated from competition,
that insulation would limit their incentive to expand and innovate and would discourage expansion, entry, and innovation by rivals. Widening market power also plausibly
contributes to the growing gap in accounting profitability between the most and least
profitable firms,44 the rising profit share of U.S. gross domestic product,45 and a secular
slowdown in business investment.46

Harms from market power
Firms exercise market power in their output markets (as sellers) when they raise prices
relative to what they would charge in a competitive market or when they alter analogous
terms of trade adversely to buyers (their customers).47 As the reference to analogous
terms of trade indicates, firms exercising market power may do so on a range of competitive dimensions—most obviously by raising prices, but also by reducing quality or
convenience, modifying product features, reducing discounts to customers, or altering
the geographic locations or product niches they serve.
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The definition of buyer market power is analogous: Firms exercise market power in their
input markets (as buyers) when they lower prices or alter terms of trade adversely to
sellers. When seller market power is exercised by a dominant firm, it is termed monopoly power; when buyer market power is exercised by a dominant firm, it is termed
monopsony power.
As market power has widened in the U.S. economy, its adverse effects have grown. Some
of those adverse effects appear primarily in the specific markets affected by the exercise
of market power, while others may be experienced economy-wide.

Harms within the affected markets
For the most part, antitrust analysis adopts what economists refer to as a partial equilibrium framework, looking at competitive harms within the markets potentially affected
by the exercise of market power. From that perspective, the exercise of market power by
sellers (in output markets) is harmful in several ways, among them:
• Wealth transfer and allocative efficiency loss
• Wasteful rent-seeking
• Slowed productivity improvements and innovation in affected markets
Each of these harmful outcomes in affected markets is complex and, for that reason,
important to understand.

Wealth transfer and allocative efficiency loss
The exercise of market power in output markets leads to a wealth transfer from buyers to sellers—buyers are overcharged, conferring monopoly profits on sellers. Market
power also creates what’s known as an allocative efficiency loss, or deadweight loss,
which arises because some transactions that would occur in a competitive market are
not made—even though buyers value the product or service more than it costs sellers to
make or provide it. Hence the economy sacrifices wealth (gains from trade) potentially
available to be shared between buyers and sellers.
The wealth transfer (lost surplus to buyers) and the allocative efficiency loss (lost aggregate surplus) are both considered harms from the exercise of market power.48 These
harms are most easily described in a market for a homogenous product sold at a single
price—perhaps grains, crude oil, raw metals, or industrial gases—though similar harms
arise when products or services are differentiated or not always sold at identical prices,
or when competition is primarily in quality, convenience, or features rather than price,
as with branded consumer products, professional services, or transportation.
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Wasteful rent-seeking
An efficiency loss from wasteful rent-seeking arises when firms compete for the opportunity to profit from exercising market power.49 That may happen when sellers spend
resources lobbying to secure or protect a government-granted privilege to sell to buyers
free from competition, as might be conferred, for example, through certificate-of-need
laws for hospitals—which can enable hospitals to serve a community free of competition—or patents, which are awarded by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
Moreover, when sellers spend resources to erect barriers to entry and exclude rivals
through means not involving the government, those expenditures also may be wasteful.

Slowed productivity improvements and innovation in affected markets
The exercise of market power also may have adverse dynamic consequences for productivity and innovation.50 First, the exercise of market power slows the rate at which firms
improve products and production processes, and lower costs.51 The loss of competition
reduces firms’ incentives to expand markets and take business from their rivals, which
they might do by cutting costs and prices, improving quality and features, developing
new and better products and production processes, or enhancing the value they offer
customers by providing increased variety and better services.
The loss of competition also inhibits productivity-enhancing selection—the tendency
of the best products and most-efficient producers to win out, as products, technologies,52 business models, plants, and firms that are unable to price competitively or attract
sufficient customers to remain profitable are forced from the marketplace. Not surprisingly, modern economic and business literatures consistently and convincingly demonstrate that enhanced competition in an industry leads to greater productivity and that
the exercise of market power reduces it.53
Second, firms may seek to innovate in order to escape competitive pressures, which means
they tend to innovate less when they have durable market power protecting them from the
entry of other firms into their markets. There is a theoretical qualification: The exercise of
market power could instead enhance innovation incentives if a firm’s pre-existing market
power reduces the likelihood that its rivals will quickly copy its new products or processes,
then compete so aggressively as to prevent the firm from earning a profit sufficient to
justify its investments in research and development.54 That qualification is unlikely to be
important in most markets where antitrust issues arise, however, because firms making
major R&D investments usually have many reasons other than pre-existing market power
for expecting to appropriate sufficient returns, even with some imitation.55
Moreover, even if the prospect of greater post-innovation competition means a dominant firm would expect to earn less by innovating, the firm may still be led to keep
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investing in R&D for fear of losing out to its rivals—many of which may themselves
have a strong incentive to pursue new products and production processes in order to
steal business from the dominant firm.56 For all these reasons, greater competition—
not greater market power—generally enhances the prospects for innovation,57 and the
exercise of market power tends to slow innovation and productivity improvements in
the affected markets.58
The exercise of market power by buyers (in input markets, including labor markets)
leads to static and dynamic harms within affected markets analogous to the three types
of harms arising from seller market power.59 When buyers exercise market power, suppliers (the sellers) are paid too little, so wealth is transferred to buyers. In addition, allocative efficiency losses can arise because resources (the inputs) may not be employed in
the markets where they are most valued. If the hospitals in a city collude to depress the
wages paid to nurses below competitive levels—as hospitals in cities across the nation
have allegedly done60—then they will pay nurses too little, hire fewer nurses than they
would otherwise, and lead some nurses to take non-nursing jobs.
Moreover, if lessened input purchases restrict downstream production, then the reduction in downstream output could generate additional allocative efficiency losses. If
hospitals exercising market power as buyers hire fewer nurses, patient care may suffer.
The exercise of market power by buyers also can also lead to insufficient supplier investment
in improving production processes and developing product and service improvements, creating dynamic harms analogous to the way innovation and productivity are discouraged by
the exercise of market power by sellers. If cable providers are able to depress the prices they
pay for video programming through the exercise of market power in purchasing content, for
example, content providers may invest less in developing new programs.
Competition can be wasteful at times. Competing firms typically make duplicative fixed
expenditures,61 and competition can lead to excessive entry into existing or new markets.62 Notwithstanding these qualifications, the economics literature taken as a whole
strongly supports the view that market competition is beneficial and market power is
harmful within the affected markets, accounting for both static and dynamic effects.
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Economy-wide harms
Looking beyond the individual markets affected by market power, the exercise of market power is harmful to the U.S. economy as a whole. Although competition operates
market-by-market and industry-by-industry, the scope of market power can affect the
overall economy. The resulting harms are not limited to the participants in the particular
markets in which competition has declined. Instead, the exercise of market power may
result in slowed economic growth and increasing economic inequality.

Slowed economic growth
The cross-national and cross-industry studies undertaken by the McKinsey Global
Institute, summarized by William W. Lewis in 2004 for a popular business audience
in “The Power of Productivity: Wealth, Poverty, and the Threat to Global Stability,”
demonstrate that differences in competition in product markets across nations are likely
as important as cross-national differences in macroeconomic policies and more important than cross-national differences in labor and capital markets in explaining variation
in productivity and economic performance.63 National economies do better, Lewis
concluded, when competition is both “intense” and “fair” (not distorted by governmental subsidies to less productive firms).64 Another leading expert on business strategy,
Harvard Business School’s Michael Porter, reached a similar conclusion from a large
cross-national study. Porter found that “vigorous domestic rivalry” in an industry helps
make that national industry successful.65
To similar effect, economists seeking to understand why some nations have grown wealthy
consistently find that impediments to competition—which are frequently imposed at the
behest of private interests with a stake in protecting existing economic and social arrangements—impede innovation, growth, and prosperity.66 These studies reinforce the plausibility of the connection between the systematic widening of market power by firms and
the decline in dynamism in the U.S. economy over the past few decades.
When firms and industries can secure long-lasting political power through their size and
lobbying influence,67 their economic and political power can reinforce each other in a
vicious circle. Market power may give firms the resources to create and exploit political
power, which they may use to protect or extend their economic advantages—and then
invest some of the resulting rents to extend their political power.68

Increased inequality
The exercise of market power also probably contributes to economy-wide inequality
because the returns from market power go disproportionately to the wealthy. Increases
in producer surplus from the exercise of market power (the wealth transfer) accrue pri-
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marily to a firm’s shareholders and its top executives, who are wealthier on average than
the median consumer. In a recent year, the top 1 percent of the wealth distribution held
half of stock and mutual fund assets, and the top 10 percent held more than 90 percent
of those assets.69 Unionized workers in the past may have been able to appropriate some
of the profits from the exercise of market power, but with the decline of private-sector
unionization, this possibility now has limited practical importance.
Whether economy-wide harms arise from slowed economic growth or increased
inequality, the extent to which markets are competitive is far from the only determinant
of economy-wide productivity, growth, and inequality. While the economic literature
has yet to measure successfully the magnitude with which increasing market power
has contributed to the post-1970s slowdown in the rate of U.S. productivity growth or
the rise in inequality,70 it is nonetheless evident that market power retards growth and
enhances inequality—making it plausible that widening market power over the same
period has contributed to these adverse economy-wide trends.

Conclusion
Our well-established antitrust norms, precedents, and institutions undoubtedly do
much to deter the exercise of market power by firms. But that is not a reason for complacency: Market power is a substantial and widening problem for the U.S. economy
today.71 The resulting harms may extend beyond the individual markets affected to the
economy as a whole—in the form of slowed productivity and economic growth, and
increased inequality. The surprising conjunction of widening market power with welldeveloped judicial norms against anticompetitive conduct and well-established antitrust
enforcement institutions presents a challenge for academic researchers and policymakers alike: to determine where competition has been harmed, establish whether and how
anticompetitive conduct undermines broad-based and equitable U.S. economic growth,
and identify ways that courts, antitrust enforcers, and policymakers can do better to
deter anticompetitive conduct.
—Jonathan B. Baker is professor of law at American University Washington
College of Law. He has served as the director of the Bureau of Economics
at the Federal Trade Commission and as the chief economist of the Federal
Communications Commission.
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markets. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core
Competition Concern, 78 Antitrust L.J. 527, 539-43 (2013).
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15 Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, How Do Cartels
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Paradox, 57 J.L. & Econ. S33 (2014). The vertical restraints
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16 Alexander MacKay & David Aron Smith, The Empirical
Effects of Minimum Resale Price Maintenance on Prices and
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17 See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of
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Antitrust L.J. 1, 17-23 (2015).
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See generally, Jonathan B. Baker, A Preface to Post-Chicago
Antitrust, in Post Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law 60,
66-67 (Roger van den Bergh, Roberto Pardolesi & Antonio
Cucinotta eds., 2002). In addition, taking their cue from
decisions like these, the lower courts modified the rule
governing exclusive dealing. Id. at 67. Looking to the
outcome, reasoning, and tone of judicial decisions since
that time, the Supreme Court and the appellate courts have
applied the more relaxed approach to address exclusionary
conduct without consistently favoring either defendants or
plaintiffs. See Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 Antitrust L.J. 527, 536-37 (2013).
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José Azar, Sahil Raina & Martin Schmalz, Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition (Jan. 17, 2016) (unpublished
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developed niches, and some may seek to build on that success by adding capabilities similar to those of incumbents,
but even then, incumbent advantages may allow the latter
firms to exercise market power for a long time.
24 In general, for reasons discussed below, greater competition would be expected to increase the rate of innovation,
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may have broadened and, in consequence, now include
more participants. E.g., Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Concerning the Proposed Merger of Office Depot, Inc.
and OfficeMax, Inc., No. 131–0104 (Nov. 1, 2013), https://
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Reason, 57 J. L. & Econ. S101 (2014). Peltzman attributes
growing concentration to lax merger policy, but does not
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Labor Share, 107 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proceedings) (2017,
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across manufacturing, finance, services, utilities, retail trade,
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increasingly concentrated among firms with superior products or higher productivity, though their empirical results
could also mean that firms exercise greater market power.
The market definitions used in this study and Peltzman’s
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employed in antitrust analysis. Cf. Gregory J. Werden, The
Divergence of SIC Industries from Antitrust Markets: Some
Evidence from Price Fixing Cases, 28 Econ. Letters 193 (1988)
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Antitrust Limits in U.S., Wall St. J. (Oct. 18, 2015) (finding
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ssrn.com/abstract=2879035, (questioning the reliability
of concentration measures based on Compustat data
and reporting Herfindahl-Hirschman Index measures for
broadly defined industries based on U.S. Census Bureau
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may achieve a similar anticompetitive outcome through
parallel accommodating conduct not pursuant to a prior
understanding. Absent repeated interaction, for example,
competition may be dampened when firms find it costly
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Pa. L. Rev. 1093 (2014).
36 Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 Yale L. J. 470 (2011).
See Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper
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(2016) (finding a declining likelihood of rapid employment
growth by startups since 2000).
42 See Ryan A. Decker, John Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin & Javier Miranda, Where Has All the Skewness Gone? The Decline
in High-Growth (Young) Firms in the U.S., 86 Eur. Econ. Rev. 4
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Industries, 1879–1939, 51 J. Indus. Econ. 1 (2003) (finding that
competition spurred innovation).
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67 The disproportionate influence of the wealthiest on public
policy has been well documented. E.g., Martin Gilens, Affluence
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accounts is taken into account, the top 10 percent owned
more than 80 percent of stock and mutual fund assets. Id.
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grown slowly since, excepting a decade of more rapid growth
beginning in 1995. Martin Neil Baily & Nicholas Montalbano,
Why is US Productivity Growth So Slow? Possible Explanations
and Policy Responses 3 fig. 1 (Brookings Hutchins Center
Working Paper No. 22, 2016). Inequality has been rising since
the 1980s. See Edward N. Wolff, Household Wealth Trends in
the United States, 1962–2013: What Happened Over the Great
Recession? 50 tbl. 2 & 51 tbl. 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 20733, Dec. 2014). The likely timing of the
productivity slowdown, the rise in inequality, and the growth
of market power are not perfectly consistent, but none are
measured well, so the timing is not decisive for evaluating
whether they are related.
71 Antitrust enforcement is not costless, and some steps taken to
prevent anticompetitive conduct risk chilling beneficial conduct, so it is unreasonable to expect even the best antitrust
institutions to deter market power completely. But it is unlikely that the market power now exercised is socially efficient.
See Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17
J. Econ. Persp. 27, 42-45 (2003) (explaining why the benefits of
antitrust enforcement likely dwarf the costs).
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